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Abstract
Observed changes in corporation tax revenues from year to year,
which include the eﬀects of changes in tax rates, deductions and com-
pliance, appear to be highly volatile relative to proﬁts, the tax base.
This paper examines whether the ‘built-in’ ﬁscal drag properties of
corporation tax can be expected to display similar properties. Simple,
conceptual modelling demonstrates that the corporate tax revenue
elasticity does indeed display this property in the presence of regu-
lar cyclical ﬂuctuation in proﬁt growth, suggesting that much of the
observed volatility is inherent to the corporation tax system.
∗This research was conducted while Norman Gemmell was at HMRC’s Analysis de-
partment. We are grateful to colleagues there for their support of this research, especially
David Ulph and Edwin Ko. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and
do not necessarily reﬂect those of HMRC. We are grateful for comments from participants
at presentations at H.M. Treasury and the New Zealand Treasury and Inland Revenue
Department.
11 Introduction
Growth rates of corporation tax receipts in the UK are known to ﬂuctuate
widely from year to year, both absolutely and relative to proﬁts — the main
corporation tax base.1 Tax revenue authorities have found it increasingly
diﬃcult to provide reliable forecasts of corporation taxes, even when given
reasonably accurate projections of proﬁts. These revenue changes in rela-
tion to proﬁts could reﬂect a combination of factors. First, there are the
inherent, or ‘built-in’, properties of the UK corporation tax system; these
are associated with ‘ﬁscal drag’. Second, revenues are inﬂuenced by discre-
tionary changes in tax rates, thresholds and other conditions aﬀecting tax
liability. Third, tax revenue changes can be aﬀected by changes in avoidance
and evasion.
The present paper concentrates on analysing the potential contribution
of the built-in, or ﬁscal drag, properties of the corporation tax system in
the UK.2 In particular it seeks to explain how far the observed volatility
in the buoyancy of corporation tax revenues, with respect to proﬁts, can
be explained by the tax’s ﬁscal drag properites. This is important because
if relatively large changes in tax revenues, relative to proﬁt changes, are
indeed an inherent characteristic of the corporation tax system, substantial
challenges are raised for tax forecasting.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reports evidence relating to
buoyancy in the UK over the last twenty-ﬁve years or so, demonstrating the
extent of its volatility. Section 3 introduces the key concept of ﬁscal drag as
it applies to corporation taxes. A commonly used measure of ﬁscal drag is
1Corporate tax revenues have also remained high despite periodic decreases in the
statutory tax rate. Devereux et al. (2004) examined various empirical factors associated
with the buoyant UK corporation tax revenues since 1980 and concluded that the primary
explanation lies in the strong growth of ﬁnancial companies’ proﬁts. In eﬀect, this provided
an expanding tax base to compensate for reductions in the statutory rate.
2Previous papers which have examined revenue aspects of the UK corporation tax
include Young (1992), Basu et al. (2003), Metz and Weale (2003), and Devereux et al.
(2004). The ﬁrst three papers generally focus on forecasting models or methods, and none
deals explicitly with ﬁscal drag properties. Measuring eﬀective rates of corporation tax has
also been a focus of a number of recent papers including Nicodeme (2001) and Devereux
and Klemm (2003).
2the tax revenue elasticity. Section 4 therefore discusses the factors aﬀecting
the revenue elasticity of individual ﬁrms, along with the aggregate revenue
elasticity. An important aspect of this is the corporate tax schedule.3 Sec-
tion 5 therefore describes the schedule of UK corporate tax rates applicable
to total proﬁts net of deductions. This requires special attention in the cor-
poration tax context because it diﬀers from the type of tax function typically
used in the context of personal income taxation (the main focus of previous
studies of ﬁscal drag). Section 6 examines the likely variation in the revenue
elasticity over the economic cycle. Conclusions are in section 7.
2 Corporation Tax Buoyancy in the UK
Corporation tax revenues can be measured either in cash or accrual terms.
The former measures the amount of tax paid by companies and received by
the UK Revenue and Customs department (HMRC) in a given period, while
the latter measures the corporation tax liability as assessed using the tax
code during a given period (usually a ﬁscal year).
Using HMRC data on corporation tax accruals and proﬁts, available on
a consistent basis from 1992/93, Figure 1 shows the growth rates of tax
accrual, dT/T, and gross taxable proﬁts, dP/P, compared to GDP growth,
d(GDP)/GDP.4 This demonstrates the much greater variability in gross proﬁt
growth compared with GDP growth rates. Furthermore, although both cor-
poration tax accruals and proﬁts are relatively volatile, their growth rates
follow quite diﬀerent patterns. This latter feature contributes substantially
to highly volatile corporation tax buoyancy in Figure 2.
Tax buoyancy is measured as the growth in tax revenues (receipts or ac-
3The term shedule is used here to refer to the form of the tax function, rather than
the source of income. Tax regulations are expressed in terms of a ‘schedular’ structure,
w h e r ee a c hs o u r c eo rs c h e d u l eh a si t so w nr u les. Indeed the UK system is complicated by
the fact that the diﬀerent sources allow or disallow particular proﬁto ﬀ-sets or tax credits,
depending on the source of the proﬁt (such as UK trading proﬁts, foreign-sourced proﬁts,
and proﬁts from property transactions).
4These HMRC proﬁt data relate only to company proﬁt as declared for tax purposes and
therefore treats all company gross losses as zero proﬁts. They are therefore quite diﬀerent
from proﬁts in companies’ commercial accounts which include both positive proﬁts and
losses.
3cruals) divided by the growth in proﬁts or GDP. Figure 2 shows the accruals-
based buoyancy measure (with respect to GDP and proﬁts) and compares this
with a receipts-based measure.5 Corporation tax accruals are derived directly
from the HMRC measure of gross proﬁts liable to UK tax, so this provides a
more consistent denominator for the accruals-based buoyancy measure (from
1992/93). The buoyancy of corporation tax receipts can be examined over a
longer period by using the Oﬃce of National Statistics measure of proﬁts —
the gross operating surplus of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial companies (denoted
F+NF GOS).6 This is also shown in Figure 2.
It can be seen that accrual buoyancy with respect to GDP varies approx-
i m a t e l yw i t h i nt h er a n g e- 5t o+ 5 ,w h e r e+ 5i m p l i e st h a tt a xg r e wﬁve times
as fast as GDP. However, negative buoyancy values can arise either because
GDP growth is negative or because tax growth is negative, but not both. If
both are negative, a positive buoyancy value results. Receipts and accruals
buoyancy can be seen to be quite diﬀe r e n t ,a tl e a s to na na n n u a lb a s i s .T h i s
reﬂects the diﬀerent proﬁt series used in the denominator of each measure
and the impact of timing diﬀerences between corporation tax receipts and
accruals.7 The large negative values arise in years of negative proﬁtg r o w t h
which are not suﬃciently large or sustained to produce negative tax growth.
However, unusually large negative proﬁt growth of almost -4 per cent in
2001-02 led to a fall in tax accruals for that year such that accruals buoy-
ancy remained positive. Large positive or negative buoyancy values tend to
arise when annual GDP or proﬁt growth is close to zero, so that the small
denominator generates a high buoyancy value.
5The accruals-based measure of proﬁts used here is the HMRC measure of
gross taxable trading proﬁts and other taxable income and net capital gains; see
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/corporate_tax/table11_2.pdf. Corporate tax accrual is
also available from this source.
6Constructing receipts buoyancy measures using economy-wide gross operating surplus
(GOS) yields similar evidence of volatility though peaks and troughs often do not coin-
cide. Economy-wide GOS includes F+NF GOS as well as the gross operating surplus of
households, non-proﬁt institutions (serving households) and general government.
7Corporation tax in the UK can be paid either in advance or in arrears of a company’s
assessed liability. Hence, tax receipts and accruals rarely match exactly in a given ﬁscal
year and can sometimes vary markedly. For example, in 1999 when the Quarterly Instal-
ment Payment (QIPs) system was introduced, receipts exceeded accruals by around 25

















































































































































































































































































Receipts Buoyancy w.r.t. (F+NF) GOS
Accruals Buoyancy w.r.t. Gross Profits
Figure 2: Corporation Tax Buoyancy
5The tax buoyancy observed in Figure 2 could result from a number of fac-
tors. First, the built-in ﬂexibility, or ﬁscal drag, properties of the tax struc-
ture generate automatic changes in revenues as the tax base changes. Second,
revenues can be aﬀected by discretionary changes in tax rates or other tax
parameters. Third, changes in revenue can be inﬂuenced by changes in com-
pliance eﬀort or eﬃciency of collection. Although there have been numerous
discretionary changes to the corporation tax regime in the UK over the period
examined here, and possibly changes in corporation tax compliance of un-
known magnitude, it would be surprising if these factors could substantially
account for the observed volatility in corporation tax buoyancy. This raises
the question of whether ﬁscal drag, as captured by the tax revenue elasticity,
can explain the observed buoyancy volatility. The following sections exam-
ine how far modelling of this revenue elasticity is capable of generating such
volatility.8
3 Corporation Tax Buoyancy and Fiscal Drag
Fiscal drag is a familiar feature of income taxes where the existence of ﬁxed
or income-related tax allowances, and rising marginal tax rates generate a
rising share of total income paid in income tax as average incomes rise. Fiscal
drag is therefore a common feature of progressive taxes. It can be measured
in unit-free terms by the revenue elasticity of a tax — the automatic per-
centage increase in tax revenues divided by the percentage increase in the
tax base. For progressive taxes this elasticity exceeds one, as revenues rise
proportionately faster than the tax base.
Despite numerous studies of the ﬁscal drag properties of personal income
and, to a lesser extent, indirect taxes, there is very little existing analysis of
corporation tax ﬁscal drag.9 This may reﬂect, in part, a view that there is
8This paper concentrates on the conceptual aspects of the corporation tax revenue
elasticity. In Creedy and Gemmell (2006b), a microsimulation model is developed and
applied to HMRC data to demonstrate the empirical contribution of ﬁscal drag to the
buoyancy of UK corporation tax.
9For surveys of, and contributions to, the literature on ﬁscal drag of income and indirect
taxes, see Creedy and Gemmell (2002a, b; 2004; 2006a), Heinemann (2001).
6less normative signiﬁcance to a tax that leads to companies with larger prof-
its paying proportionately more tax, compared to a tax where individuals or
households with higher personal incomes pay proportionately more tax. Sec-
ondly, where most corporation tax revenues are paid by companies at a single
rate, ﬁscal drag is often presumed to be of little quantitative signiﬁcance.
In the UK, there are two non-zero corporation tax rates: 19 per cent and
30 per cent.10 However, the lower, ‘small company rate’ of 19 per cent is
levied on companies with net taxable proﬁts (that is, proﬁts after all deduc-
tions) below £1.5 million.11 It therefore contributes only a small fraction
of total revenue raised, the remainder being collected at the 30 per cent
rate. Increasing company proﬁts, which push companies across the net proﬁt
threshold when they begin to pay tax at the 30 per cent rate, are therefore
unlikely to be an important contributor to the overall ﬁscal drag properties
of the UK corporation tax system.
However, UK corporation tax has two features which could contribute im-
portantly to ﬁscal drag. Firstly various deductions, allowable against proﬁts,
or in the form of tax credits, mean that about 60 per cent of gross proﬁtd e -
clared for tax purposes is tax-free. Thus for a typical company, the marginal
tax rate on proﬁt is higher than its average tax rate. This generates ﬁscal
drag. Secondly, proﬁts either before or after deductions can be negative, but
negative proﬁts (losses) are not eligible for a tax refund. Though various
deductions (for example, group relief) provide a form of tax refund on some
losses, this is not suﬃc i e n tt oe n s u r et h a tt h ee ﬀective refund on a given loss
is equal to the eﬀective tax on an equivalent amount of proﬁt.
Finally, this section has used terms such as proﬁts, deductions and tax
base without deﬁning them precisely. In the remainder of this paper, the
corporation tax base is deﬁned as ‘gross (taxable) proﬁts’; that is gross proﬁts
deﬁned for tax purposes — total proﬁts declared to HMRC as potentially liable
to corporation tax. This is distinct from the accounting deﬁnition of gross
proﬁts where some items of income or expenditure in company accounts are
10This simple summary conceals the complexity of the structure, which is described in
more detail in section 5.
11Even this value exaggerates the importance of the 19% rate since, for companies in
groups, the £1.5 million threshold is split between all the companies in the group.
7treated diﬀerently (for example, interest payments and capital expenditure).
Net (taxable) proﬁts are gross (taxable) proﬁts minus all deductions, where
deductions are deﬁn e da sa l lt a xa l l o w a n c e sc l a i m e di nt h ef o r mo fp r o ﬁt
oﬀ-sets (for example, capital allowances) plus the proﬁto ﬀ-set equivalents of
tax credits (for example, double taxation relief). Corporation tax liability is
therefore obtained by multiplying the relevant corporation tax rate by net
proﬁts.
4 The Corporation Tax Revenue Elasticity
This section examines the basic characteristics of the corporate tax revenue
elasticity as it applies to an individual company and all companies combined.
Subsection 4.1 introduces the revenue elasticity in the context of a single
company. The role played by deductions is considered further in Subsection
4.2. Subsection 4.3 considers aggregation over all ﬁrms.
4.1 Revenue Elasticity for Individual Companies
Consider a single company. Gross proﬁts are P and total deductions are D,
so that net proﬁts, PT,a r e :
P
T = P − D (1)
Suppose, for simplicity, that there is a single tax rate of t. Hence when
PT > 0, the tax liability, T (P),i s :
T (P)=t(P − D) (2)
and when PT ≤ 0,T(P)=0 . The tax revenue elasticity, ηT,P,f o rt h ec o m -
pany is deﬁned as the proportional increase in tax divided by the proportional










The elasticity is thus the ratio of the marginal to the average tax rate. From











































Equation (6) shows that, for a taxpaying company (for which P−D>0), the
second term in brackets exceeds unity if D>0, but since dD/dP S 0, the
ﬁrst term is ambiguously signed. Thus the size and sign of both the level of
deductions relative to net or gross proﬁts, D/P (recalling that P = PT +D),
and the change in deductions relative to gross proﬁts, dD/dP,a r ec r u c i a l
determinants of the revenue elasticity. If deductions are independent of gross





In this case the revenue elasticity is simply the ratio of gross to net taxable
proﬁt. For companies with positive but very low tax liabilities, that is P −D
is small, the elasticity is large, and higher proﬁts reduce the elasticity towards
unity. For companies with a zero tax liability (that is, where P − D ≤ 0),
the revenue elasticity is zero.
Figure 3 illustrates this case. The proﬁle, WXX
0Y, shows the revenue
elasticity as proﬁt increases. Along the range WX, proﬁt increases from zero
or negative values towards P = D, and the elasticity remains zero. At P = D
the elasticity becomes inﬁnitely large because the denominator in equation
(7) is zero. Beyond this point, over the range X
0Y, the elasticity declines
asymptotically towards unity as P increases further.
9Revenue
Elasticity






Figure 3: Individual Revenue Elasticity
4.2 Revenue Elasticity with Endogenous Deductions
In general the elasticity of deductions with respect to gross proﬁts, ηD,P,i s
non-zero and its behaviour has an important impact on revenue elasticities,
as seen from equation (6). Deductions available to be claimed depend, for
example, on investment, via capital allowances, and on past proﬁts and losses
of the company. In the case of a company within a group, deductions also
depend on group members’ proﬁts and losses. This subsection considers the
eﬀects of these on the revenue elasticity.
To the extent that deductions are mainly composed of capital allowances,
and investment expenditure rises with proﬁts, this tends to increase deduc-
tions (with a lag), so that dD/dP > 0. On the other hand, losses would be
expected to fall as proﬁts rise, so that dD/dP > 0 is more likely. Deﬁning
capital allowances and losses claimed against proﬁts, as CA and LC respec-
tively, consider two extreme cases. First, a given level of D is made up
entirely of capital allowances, so that D = CA, and second, the same level
of D is composed entirely of losses claimed, so that D = LC.F o r a g i v e n
10level of proﬁts, the term P
P−D i n( 6 )i st h es a m ef o rb o t hc a s e sa n di sg r e a t e r
than 1.
If investment is positively correlated with proﬁts, then dD/dP > 0 for
capital allowances, whereas dD/dP < 0 for losses. For illustration, let
dCA/dP = ε and dLC/dP = −ε.T h u s t h e ﬁrst term in brackets in (6)
becomes 1 − ε for capital allowances, but 1+ε for losses. That is, losses
contribute to the revenue elasticity exceeding 1 (recalling that P
P−D > 1),
whereas capital allowances encourage a revenue elasticity less than 1. It be-
comes less than 1 if 1 − ε outweighs P
P−D in (6). Of course, both deductions
also have ‘level’ eﬀects which raise the elasticity, since greater deduction
levels imply larger values of P
P−D.
4.2.1 Group Relief
It is readily shown that the availability of group relief (compared with no
group relief deductions or single ﬁrms only) leads to higher revenue elastici-
ties for companies which remain taxpayers, and zero elasticities for previous
taxpayers whose liabilities are reduced to zero. Consider, for example, the
case of two ﬁrms, i and j,w h e r ei is in proﬁt while j makes a loss. In the
absence of group relief, or for single companies, the elasticity of ﬁrm j is zero,
while while j’s elasticity exceeds unity depending on the value of net proﬁts,
Pi − Di.
Suppose group relief becomes available, or the two companies form a
group. Firm j is able to transfer some or all of it’s losses to its partner.
In this case j’s elasticity remains zero, but deductions for the proﬁt-maker
have increased by the value of transferred losses. Firm i’s elasticity there-
fore increases — the denominator in equation (4) falls. In terms of Figure
3, the proﬁt-maker’s schedule WXX
0Y shifts rightwards by the amount of
transferred losses, D2 — D1;t h i si ss h o w ni nF i g u r e4 .
At each gross proﬁt, in excess of the new deductions level, D2,f o rﬁrm
i, the revenue elasticity is greater than previously. However, for companies
which are removed from taxpaying status as a result of group relief (those
between D1 and D2), the revenue elasticity falls to zero. The eﬀect of group










Figure 4: Elasticity with Varying Deductions
positive proﬁts and group-relieved losses within the group. However, in a sub-
sequent period, if the previously loss-making ﬁrm were to become a taxpayer,
i tw o u l dn o th a v ea c c e s st oi t sp r e v i o u sl o s s e sa sap r o ﬁto ﬀ-set. Hence its
r e v e n u ee l a s t i c i t yw o u l db el o w e rt h a ni tw o u l db ew i t h o u tt h eu s eo fg r o u p
relief — in terms of Figure 4 it would be further to the right.
This result also demonstrates the impact on the elasticity of companies
amalgamating to form groups. Amalgamation will cause the revenue elas-
ticity to increase for those proﬁt-making group members which remain tax-
payers, compared with their previous single status. However, for previous
proﬁt-making companies whose proﬁts are now eliminated by transferred
losses, the elasticity falls to zero. The elasticities of previous loss-making
companies are unaﬀected by amalgamation — they remain zero. Again, how-
ever, their future elasticities are also aﬀected by the surrender of their current
losses.
124.2.2 Consolidated Accounting
A move to consolidated accounting whereby group, rather than company,
proﬁts form the tax base, would have a similar eﬀect to group relief. However,
consolidation would eﬀectively allow some losses, which remain ‘stranded’
under the current UK group relief system, to be deducted from group proﬁts.
In terms of Figure 4 this implies a greater rightward shift of the elasticity
proﬁle compared with the group relief case. Thus a greater range of positive
proﬁts would yield a zero revenue elasticity, but the elasticities associated
with the higher tax-liable proﬁt levels would increase. This should not be
confused with the fact that, for given proﬁt levels, tax levels are lower with
consolidation. Rather, the higher revenue elasticity for taxpaying groups,
with consolidation, implies that revenues grow faster relative to proﬁts, than
previously. Hence, faster tax growth is gained at the cost of lower initial tax
levels (unless other tax parameters are changed).
4.2.3 Cyclical Eﬀects
Figures 3 and 4 are less useful to illustrate the impact on revenue elasticities
of economic booms and recessions, when deductions are expected to respond
to cyclical changes in proﬁts. An economic downturn is typically associated
both with declining proﬁts in taxpaying ﬁrms and greater losses among loss-
makers. Where losses dominate deductions, dD/dP < 0 is more likely, and
equation (6) showed the impact on the ﬁrm’s revenue elasticity if it remains a
taxpayer. Of course, cyclical ﬂuctuations can also be expected to shift some
ﬁrms into and out of taxpaying status. Clearly, how gross proﬁts and deduc-
tion change over the economic cycle is crucial for the value of the revenue
elasticity both of individual ﬁrms, and of ﬁr m si na g g r e g a t e .T h i si se x p l o r e d
further in Section 6. First, the next sections considers the determinants of
the corporation tax revenue elasticity aggregated across all ﬁrms, and the
role of the corporation tax schedule.
134.3 The Aggregate Revenue Elasticity
For governments interested in raising revenues, the major policy concern
is typically with the behaviour of aggregate, rather than individual ﬁrms’,
tax revenue. A corresponding aggregate revenue elasticity can be deﬁned as
follows. Let P =
Pn
i=1 Pi and T =
Pn
i=1 Ti denote aggregate proﬁts and
aggregate revenue, where there are i =1 ...n ﬁrms. The change in total tax







Deﬁning the aggregate revenue elasticity as η = dT
dP
P
T , it can be shown from













where ηTi,Pi is the elasticity for an individual ﬁrm, Ti/T is the share of ﬁrm i’s
tax payments in total tax revenue, and ηPi,P is the elasticity of the each ﬁrm’s
proﬁts with respect to total proﬁts. This last elasticity depends on changes
in the distribution of proﬁts. It would be equal to 1 if all proﬁts were to
change in equal proportions. However, this is not typically the case, with
proﬁtg r o w t hr a t e so f t e nq u i t ed i ﬀerent across ﬁrms; indeed it is common for
some ﬁrms to move into loss whilst others move in the opposite direction.
As a result, proﬁt dynamics can be expected to be important for estimates
of aggregate revenue elasticities, and the aggregate revenue elasticity is not
amenable to tractable analytical solutions.12
5 The Corporation Tax Schedule and Rev-
enue Elasticities
For an individual ﬁrm, the tax revenue elasticity, ηT,P,i ne q u a t i o n( 6 )h a s










12It is examined using simulation methods in Creedy and Gemmell (2006b).
14where MTR and ATR are the marginal and average tax rates (deﬁned with
respect to gross proﬁt) facing the ﬁrm - and referred to below as the Gross
MTR and ATR. Since the UK corporation tax ‘schedule’ describes the rela-
tionship between tax liabilities and net, rather than gross, proﬁts, it is useful








Equation (11) expresses ηT,P as the product of the elasticity of tax paid
with respect to net proﬁts, ηT,PT, and the elasticity of net proﬁts to gross
proﬁts, ηPT,P.T h e ﬁrst component elasticity is determined by the corpo-
ration tax ‘schedule’. In the UK this involves four net proﬁt thresholds,
m0,...,m4,t w ot a xr a t e st1 and t2, and two ‘marginal relief fractions’, F1 and
F2.Aﬁrm’s tax liability within each range is given in Table 1.
Table 1: The Corporate Tax Schedule
Proﬁt Range Tax




m0 <P T 6 m1 T
¡
PT¢
= t1PT − F1
¡
m1 − PT¢




m2 <P T 6 m3 T
¡
PT¢
= t2PT − F2
¡
m3 − PT¢




It can be seen that there are two ranges of net proﬁt, m1 <P T 6 m2
and PT >m 3 w h e r et a x a t i o ni saﬁxed proportion of net proﬁt, t1 and
t2 respectively, otherwise this proportion varies. Since the corporation tax
schedule speciﬁes the relationship between the corporation tax paid, T, and
















15The Net ATRsa n dMTRsa s s o c i a t e dw i t he a c hn e tp r o ﬁtr a n g ei nT a b l e
1, are shown in Table 2, and illustrated in Figure 5. These are based on
current UK parameter values; see Table 3.13 F o re x a m p l e ,o v e rt h er a n g e











and t1 is reduced by a fraction of the proportional diﬀerence between m1
and net proﬁt. The tax schedule obviously diﬀers from a typical income
tax schedule where, for example, a higher tax rate is applied only to income
measured above the relevant threshold, and lower ranges of income are taxed
a tl o w e rr a t e s .F o raﬁrm with PT in excess of m3, all of net taxable proﬁt
is subject to the higher rate of t2.14
T a b l e2 :N e tA v e r a g ea n dM a r g i n a lT a xR a t e s
Proﬁt Range ATR(PT) MTR(PT)
PT 6 m0 00






m1 <P T 6 m2 t1 t1






PT >m 3 t2 t2
These properties mean that although T
¡
PT¢
/P T is either constant or
increasing, the tax schedule as a whole does not display marginal tax rate
progression.15
The resulting elasticity of tax with respect to net proﬁts, ηT,PT, is illus-
trated in Figure 6. It can be seen that this elasticity is constant (and equals
13The parameter values apply to single ﬁrms where no group relief is relevant. In the
case of company groups, the proﬁt thresholds, m0 to m4, are divided by the number of
ﬁrms in the group, and the marginal relief fractions adjusted accordingly.
14The two marginal relief fractions are determined in order to ensure that there are










t2m2 − F2 (m3 − m2), and thus F2 = {m2 (t2 − t1)}/(m3 − m2).
15As Figure 5 shows, over the range m0 <P T 6 m1 the term dT/dP T = t1 + F1,a n d
this falls to t1 over the range m1 <P T 6 m2. Similarly, dT/dPT falls from t2 + F2 over
the range m2 <P T 6 m3,t ot2 when PT >m 3.
16Table 3: Parameters of the CT Schedule: 2006
Parameter Value Parameter Value
m0 10kt 1 0.19
m1 50kt 2 0.30
m2 300kF 1 19/400
m3 1500kF 2 11/400
1)a b o v em3,a n df o rm1 <P T 6 m2, but otherwise it varies with PT.T h i s
component, ηT,PT, of the overall revenue elasticity, ηT,P, is potentially im-
portant for understanding the revenue responsiveness of small ﬁrms since, as
Figure 6 illustrates, this can vary substantially with net proﬁt levels below
m3.
However, total corporation tax revenues are dominated by revenues from
large ﬁrms, where PT >m 3. For those ﬁrms, ηT,PT =1and the elasticity
of net proﬁt with respect to gross proﬁti st h es o l ed e t e r m i n a n to ft h et o t a l
revenue elasticity, ηT,P.T h a ti s ,f o rPT >m 3:
ηT,P = ηPT,P (15)
Thus, for most large ﬁrms the elasticity properties of the corporate tax
are complicated not so much by the nature of the tax schedule as by the
complexities involved in the transformation from P to PT.A s s h o w n i n
equation (6) above, this elasticity is far from straightforward, and depends
on the level of, and changes in, deductions relative to net or gross proﬁts.
Section 4 argued that the ratio of deductions to proﬁts is not in general
constant but is likely to vary over the economic cycle. As a result, the tax
revenue elasticity can also be expected to vary systematically over the cycle.
This is the subject of the following section.
6 The Revenue Elasticity over the Cycle
This section considers the likely pattern of the aggregate revenue elasticity
when proﬁts cycle round a trend growth rate. Deductions against corporation
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Figure 6: Revenue Elasticity of Tax with Respect to Net Proﬁts
18these can be expected to display both trend and cyclical aspects.16 The
aggregate elasticity, as given in equation (9), is a tax-share weighted average
of the product of each ﬁrms’ revenue elasticity and the elasticity of its proﬁts
with respect to aggregate proﬁts. If all ﬁrms move together (so that there









. In the trivial case where, for every ﬁrm, proﬁts and
deductions grow at the same rate, dPi/Pi = dDi/Di and the individual and
aggregate revenue elasticities are all unity.
The key issue therefore is whether a steady long-run trend rate of proﬁt
growth is likely to produce the conditions under which the revenue elasticity
is unity. During trend growth — though not within a cycle — it seems plausible
that proﬁts and deductions grow at similar rates. For ﬁrms which consistently
make positive proﬁts, and which therefore have no loss pools, deductions are
composed of capital allowances, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that
investment and proﬁts grow at similar rates. Though for some ﬁrms the long
run trend growth of proﬁts may at some point involve net proﬁts turning
from negative to positive, the share of such ﬁrms’ tax in total tax revenue
is likely to be so small that they have little eﬀect on the aggregate. Hence,
over the long-run a corporate tax revenue elasticity approximately equal to
one can be expected, at least in the UK where losses and capital allowances
dominate deductions claimed against corporation tax.
However, within an economic cycle these conditions cannot be expected to
hold, as company losses and investment vary from year to year in response to
economic conditions. In those periods of the cycle which have rising proﬁts,
the growth of tax revenue is likely to be lower than that of proﬁts since loss
pools — accumulated during the previous low point of the cycle — can be
deducted against proﬁts. Conversely, when proﬁts are in the falling stages of
the cycle, those loss pools will typically have been exhausted in the previous
high point, so taxation is not expected to fall as fast as proﬁts. Hence, it
is likely that aggregate tax revenue follows a smoother cycle than that of
16For example, in 2004 losses used and capital allowances accounted for over 85 per cent


















Figure 7: Moderate Cycle
proﬁts. A key source of this smoothing eﬀect is that, whereas companies’
gross proﬁts (as measured in company accounts, for example) can become
negative, the net taxable proﬁts on which CT liability is assessed cannot be
negative.17 A simple illustrative example of this smoothing eﬀect is provided
in the Appendix, for the case of a single ﬁrm.
This cyclical pattern is shown in Figure 7 using a sine wave to depict
t h ee c o n o m i cc y c l ef o rb o t h( g r o s s )p r o ﬁts and taxes, and in which proﬁt
and tax growth is always positive. As the Figure shows, proﬁtg r o w t ha b o v e
trend implies elasticity values less than one, whilst proﬁt growth below trend
implies elasticities greater than one. That is, the corporation tax revenue
elasticity would appear to be counter-cyclical.
A similar cycle is depicted in Figure 8 but in this case proﬁtg r o w t h
b e c o m e sn e g a t i v ea tt h eb o t t o mo ft h ec y c l e ,w h e r e a st a xg r o w t hr e m a i n s
p o s i t i v e . T h i sh a sad r a m a t i ce ﬀect on the cyclical aspect of the revenue
elasticity, which now exceeds one when proﬁt growth is below trend but
still positive, and the elasticity becomes negative at the bottom of the cycle
when proﬁt growth is negative. Finally, Figure 9 shows that if the cyclical
downturn is suﬃciently severe such that both tax and proﬁt growth become
17Note that data on the HMRC measure of gross proﬁts would not necessarily display
this property since negative gross proﬁts (gross losses) are recorded for tax purposes as
zero gross proﬁts. Losses appear instead as an oﬀ-set claimed against positive gross proﬁts.
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Figure 8: A Cycle with Negative Proﬁt Growth
negative, this generates even more volatility in the revenue elasticity.
Illustrative revenue elasticity proﬁles for the types of cycle depicted in
Figures 8 and 9 are shown in Figures 10 and 11. These are constructed using
a cycle based on a sine wave with values as shown in Table 4. The values
shown are within the range of observed proﬁtg r o w t hr a t e sg i v e ni nF i g u r e1 ,
a n dw e r eo b t a i n e df r o ms i n ew a v e sw i t ha na m p l i t u d eo f2 0( p r o ﬁts) and 7
(tax) around trend growth shown in the table. A wavelength of 15 was used.
Table 4: Proﬁta n dT a xG r o w t hR a t e s
Percentage growth rates
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Figure 9: A Cycle with Negative Proﬁta n dT a xG r o w t h
It is clear from these illustrative diagrams that the revenue elasticity
can be highly volatile over the cycle, especially during economic downturns.
In the case where only proﬁt growth becomes negative in a downturn, the
revenue elasticity can take large negative values, as well as relatively large
positive values either side of the downturn. When tax growth can also become
negative, it can be seen in Figure 11 that negative revenue elasticities are
smaller and much less persistent but large positive elasticities are possible
going into a downturn. These highly volatile revenue elasticities are of course
obtained using a regular smooth cycle for proﬁts and taxes, suggesting that
with more erratic proﬁt growth rates, revenue elasticities are likely to be even
more volatile.
7 Conclusions
This paper began by considering the buoyancy of corporation tax receipts




















Figure 11: Elasticity with Negative Minimum Proﬁta n dT a xG r o w t h
23in revenues as a ratio of the growth in proﬁts, or GDP. This ratio is highly
volatile from year to year. The paper then considered whether such volatility
could be a feature of the inherent or ‘ﬁscal drag’ properties of the UK’s
corporation tax system. To measure ﬁscal drag — describing the way tax
revenues grow relative to proﬁts for an unchanged tax regime —t h ep a p e r
used the tax revenue elasticity measure. Section 4 provided a discussion
of the conceptual issues involved in assessing the corporation tax revenue
elasticity. This showed that deductions, and how they change as proﬁts
grow, play a crucial role in determining whether corporation tax revenues
are expected to grow faster or slower than proﬁts. Additionally for small
ﬁrms, the nature of the corporate tax schedule — the tax rates and thresholds
applied to net proﬁts — can be important for such ﬁrms’ revenue elasticities.
The analysis highlighted the role of cyclical factors. An important aspect
for modelling to focus on is when, and to what extent, the corporation tax
revenue elasticity deviates from its expected long-run value of 1, when tax
and proﬁts grow at the same rate. Conceptual analysis and simulations
suggests a number of conclusions.
First, the volatility observed in corporation tax buoyancy is also found
to characterise the corporation tax revenue elasticity. Second, this implies
that much of the observed volatility in corporation tax receipts and accruals
could indeed be inherent to the corporation tax system, given the volatility
in the tax base, proﬁts.
Third, in mild economic downturns, corporation tax revenue elasticities
may rise (because tax growth falls less than proﬁt growth), but in more se-
vere downturns, large but temporary increases and decreases in the revenue
elasticity (and even negative elasticities) can be expected. Fourth, over the
long-run (of one or more full economic cycles), corporation tax revenues and
proﬁts can be expected to grow at around the same rate (in the absense of dis-
cretionary changes in tax rates, compliance and so on). That is, the long-run
revenue elasticity is likely to be around one. However, where there is short-
run volatility, annual averages of revenue elasticities would be a misleading
guide to long-run tax growth.
These ﬁndings have serious implications for attempts to forecast corpo-
24ration tax revenue. Experience has shown that corporation taxes are among
t h em o s td i ﬃcult to forecast, using conventional methods based, for exam-
ple, on regressions of taxes and proﬁts over time. Such regressions, using
lag structures and observations over a long time period, may be able to ap-
proximate the long-run buoyancy of corporation taxes, and limited cyclical
aspects.18 However their inability to capture discretionary tax changes mean
they cannot distinguish the ceteris paribus eﬀects of the revenue elasticity.
In addition, they tyically cannot account for the highly volatile dimension of
annual CT revenues which is captured in the modelling above. The analysis
in this paper suggests that forecasting corporation tax revenues is likely to
be especially diﬃcult during pronounced economic downturns, but can be
expected to be less problematic for above-trend ﬂuctuations when corporate
losses are less prevalent.
18For example, applying the HMRC/ONS tax and proﬁtd a t au s e di nF i g u r e2t oa
simple log-log regression of tax revenue on proﬁts, over the period 1978-2004, produces a
long-run buoyancy parameter (the coeﬃcient on log proﬁts) of 1.1. With cyclical volatility,
such parameter estimates can depend, of course, on the start/end date. For example, an
equivalent regression over 1984-2004 yields a parameter of 0.92.
25Appendix: Gross and Net Proﬁts for Single
Firms
This appendix provides an illustration of the behaviour of a ﬁrm’s gross and
net taxable proﬁts in the presence of a regular cycle. Consider a single ﬁrm
with a single proﬁt source. In the UK corporation tax system, any losses
incurred can be deducted against future proﬁts when these return to positive
values.19 The illustration below assumes that these are claimed at the earliest
available opportunity. Positive proﬁts are assumed to be taxed at a single
rate (hence tax libaility is simply equal to net proﬁts multiplied by the tax
rate), while the tax rate on losses is zero.
Figure 12 shows the cyclical behaviour of gross and net proﬁts if gross
proﬁts are assumed to follow a sine wave with an amplitude of 20 units
around a constant trend level of 5 units. This produces positive gross proﬁts
of 25 units at the top of the cycle and gross proﬁts (losses) of -15 units at
the bottom of the cycle. The areas labelled A represent periods of gross loss
while the areas labelled B (equal in size to A) represent the use of those losses
to oﬀset subsequent positive gross proﬁts. It is clear from the Figure that net
proﬁts (and hence tax liabilities) follow a ‘smoothed’ cycle compared with
gross proﬁts.
19For some sources of proﬁt in the UK, losses can alternatively be carried back one year
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Figure 12: Simulating Gross & Net ProﬁtC y c l e s
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